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## Before the Federal Communications Commission Washington, DC 20554

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WORRAL COMMEDICATIONS COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

In the Matter of	)		
	)	CC Docket No. 97-213	
Communications Assistance for	)		
Law Enforcement Act	)		

## Reply Comments of WorldCom, Inc

WorldCom, Inc ("WorldCom") respectfully submits these reply comments with respect to issues remanded to the Federal Communications Commission (the "Commission") from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ("the Court" or "the Appellate Court"). WorldCom is sensitive to the needs of Law Enforcement Agencies ("LEAs"). CALEA, however, does not authorize the Commission to require provision of the punch list items sought by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). WorldCom supports the comments of the industry and urges the Commission to conclude that the J-STD-025 (the interim industry standard, otherwise referred to as the "J-standard" or "J-STD") is not deficient and "adding the punch list items will impermissibly exceed the scope of CALEA, conflict with established electronic surveillance law, infringe upon the privacy and security of communications." Before the Commission adds any punch list items, it must determine how the J-STD-025 is deficient in meeting Communications Assistance

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for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA") requirements.<sup>2</sup> The record includes no new information to support a conclusion that the J-Standard is deficient.

The Record Does Not Reveal J-Standard Deficiencies. The Appellate Court correctly determined that the Commission failed to find any deficiency in the J-standard. No party in this proceeding has identified such a deficiency. Under the statute, the Commission has no authority to reject or modify the J-Standard.

Under CALEA, the standard must be sufficient to ensure the availability of "callidentifying information." That term is defined within the statute as encompassing "dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, destination or termination of each communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or service of a telecommunications carrier." The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ/FBI) allege that the J-standard is deficient because: it equates call-identifying information" only with telephone numbers, its interpretation of "direction" and "termination" makes those terms largely redundant with "origin" and "destination" and it results in the exclusion of substantial amounts of information to which law enforcement had traditionally had access. 4 DOJ/FBI appear to argue that the J-standard is deficient in providing the information to which they would like access. Yet, they fail to explain why it is deficient in meeting the statutory requirements regarding "call-identifying information."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> BellSouth Comments at i.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat,4279 (1994) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 2522, and 47 U.S.C. §§229, 1001-1010), ("CALEA").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> 47 U.S.C. § 1001(2)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> DOJ/FBI Comments at 29.

Additional punch list items are not call-identifying information. The punch list items include: dialed-digit extraction; subject initiated dialing and signaling information; in-band and out-of-band signaling; and party hold/join/drop information. Only one of these-"dialed digit extraction"- even potentially comprises "call-identifying information." Not only is this item not readily available to carriers, it also includes content and thus lies outside of the CALEA requirements at issue. Again, DOJ/FBI have explained why they would like access to this information, but they have not explained how the statue allows it.

Even assuming that the J-standard was deficient, which has not been shown, the Commission could not add the punch list items unless they related to "call-identifying information" that is reasonably available to the carriers. The DOJ/FBI commenters have not adequately demonstrated such a relationship.

The originating and terminating telephone numbers identify calls in the telephone network. In fact, most telephone customers are billed according to their telephone number. A telephone number is the only element that can identify a caller on the network. The carrier does not use any other signals to identify the calling or called party. The industry used the most logical "reasonably available" information in a carrier's network when defining "call-identifying information" in the J-STD. The DOJ/FBI's claim, for example, that a "busy signal" is call-identifying information is in error. The DOJ/FBI is clearly confusing "identification" with "call status." Call status is undoubtedly outside the scope of CALEA because is it not related to the origin, direction,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Id. at 26. "Network signaling that reports the progress of outgoing call attempts constitutes "callidentifying information" because it identifies how the call attempt is being terminated by the called party's equipment, facilities and services......Busy signals and ringing permit law enforcement to "identify" these two different kinds of termination"

destination or termination of the call. A caller that reaches a busy signal has not even established a call in telephony terms. While DOJ/FBI explain how it would use signals other than telephone numbers, it does not explain how this is within the scope of CALEA.

The DOJ/FBI commenters fail to resolve a significant problem with the provision of post-cut through dialed digits. Such a provision would necessarily give LEAs access to content for which such dialing is used, for example, to access automated banking services. This content is clearly not "call-identifying information." Indeed, DOJ/FBI concedes that this is the case. They then argue that the Commission should nonetheless require that carriers implement the capability to provide such information, even if they need never provide it. This is an absurd result. The Commission cannot impose a requirement based on speculation that it might be related to call-identifying information.

Post-cut-through dialed digits include content: The DOJ/FBI recognize that dialed digits will reveal content. It argues that the Commission could modify its order to take into account the possibility that carriers might one day be able to distinguish between dialed digits that might be "call identifying information" and those that constitute content. DOJ/FBI suggest that at such a time the Commission could allow carriers to filter out "transactional" digits. Again, this is completely backwards. DOJ/FBI are asking the Commission to require today what CALEA does not allow, subject to the possibility that this defect might later be cured. They offer no precedent for this unique approach to statutory interpretation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Id. at 50.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Id. at 50-51.

<sup>°</sup> Id. at 52.

DOJ/FBI further argues that the Commission should require this capability pending a court determination that the statute provides sufficient legal authority for the carrier to use the capability. The Commission cannot countenance this absurd placing of the cart before the horse. Carriers should not be required to deploy technology on the possibility that a court might approve its use.

The DOJ/FBI commenters have also failed to explain why the industry-proposed alternatives are insufficient. They have simply asserted a preference for access to post-cut-through dialed digits. This is not a proper basis on which the Commission could include this requirement.

The Commission should adopt a rule that clarifies that CALEA requirements do not preclude LEAs from obtaining proper legal authority. Worldcom supports DOJ/FBI's recommendation that the Commission adopt a rule to clarify that its rules should not be misconstrued to compel the delivery of information in the absence of proper legal authorization. The rule should distinguish between capabilities that carriers must have to comply with a court order or other lawful authorization, and what carriers must do absent such authorization. This would be a beneficial addition.

Congress did not intend CALEA requirements to be implemented regardless of cost. DOJ/FBI suggest that with respect to cost, the only inquiry is whether there is a less costly alternative to a particular capability. In its view it is irrelevant that a particular capability might cost more to implement than any national decision-maker could justify. Congress did not delegate to this Commission the authority to adopt requirements regardless of their cost. There must be a point where a particular capability is simply too costly, even though there may be no less costly alternative. The DOJ/FBI is not correct

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Id. at 51.

when they imply that cost is not an issue for items that are not in the J-STD.<sup>10</sup> CALEA implementation is not open-ended. Congress was clear in its intent that CALEA implementation must not overburden the industry. If Congress intended for the cost of complying with CALEA to be open-ended as indicated by the DOJ/FBI, they would not have capped the DOJ/FBI's funding for the industry of this legislation at \$500 million.

Respectfully Submitted,

World Com, Inc

Mary De Luca

Senior Policy Advisor,

1801 Pennsylvania Ave, NW

Washington DC 2006

202-887-2035

December 8, 2000

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Id. at 45.

## STATEMENT OF VERIFICATION

I have read the foregoing, and to the best of my knowledge, the information, and belief there is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay. I verify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 8, 2000.

Mary De Luc

Senior Policy Adviser

1801 Pennsylvania Ave, NW

Washington, DC 2006

(202) 887-3045

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, Barbara Nowlin, do hereby certify that on this 8th day of December, 2000, copies of the foregoing Reply Comments of WorldCom, Inc. were served on each of the following persons:

Honorable William E. Kennard\*\*
Federal Communications Commission

The Portals

445 12th Street, S.W.

8th Floor

Washington, DC 20554

Harold Furchgott-Roth\*\*

Federal Communciations Commission

The Portals

445 12th Street, S.W.

8th Floor

Washington, DC 20554

Susan Ness\*\*

Federal Communications Commission

The Portals

445 12th Street, S.W.

8th Floor

Washington, DC 20554

Michael Powell\*\*

Federal Communications Commission

The Portals

445 12th Street, S.W.

8th Floor

Washington, DC 20554

Gloria Tristani\*\*

Federal Communications Commission

The Portals

445 12th Street, S.W.

8th Floor

Washington, DC 20554

Geraldine Matise\*\*

Federal Communications Commission

The Portals

445 12th Street, S.W.

Room 7A123

Washington, DC 20554

Rodney Small\*\*

Federal Communications Commission

The Portals

445 12th Street, S.W.

Room7A121

Washington, DC 20554

David Ward\*\*

Federal Communications Commission

The Portals

445 12th Street, S.W.

Room 6A333

Washington, DC 20554

Gayle Teicher\*\*

Federal Communications Commission

The Portals

445 12th Street, S.W.

Room 6A464

Washington, DC 20554

International Transcription Service\*\*

1231 20<sup>th</sup> Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20036

Louis J. Freeh, Director

Larry R. Parkinson

Federal Bureau of Investigation 935 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, DC 20535

Honorable Janet Reno Attorney General of the United States U.S. Department of Justice 601 D Street, N.W., Room 9106 Washington, DC 20530

Douglas N. Letter U.S. Department of Justice 601 D Street, N.W., Room 9106 Washington, DC 20530

Joaquin R. Carbonell Carol L. Tacker 1100 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 910 Atlanta, GA 30309

M. Robert Sutherland Angela N. Brown BellSouth Corporation Suite 1700 1155 Peachtree Street, N.E. Atlanta, GA 30309-3610

Mark C. Rosenblum Stephen C. Garavito Martha Lewis Marcus AT&T Corp. Room 1131M1 295 North Maple Avenue Basking Ridge, NJ 07920

Michael Altschul Randall S. Coleman Cellular Telecommunications Industry Asso. 1250 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Suite 200 Washington, DC 20036

James X. Dempsey Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20006 Scott Blake Harris Kelly S. McGinn Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis LLP 1200 Eighteenth Street, NW Washington, DC 20036

Hope Thurrott Roger K. Toppins Paul Mancini SBC Communications, Inc. 1401 I Street NW, 11<sup>th</sup> Floor Washington, DC 20005

Grant Seiffert
Matthew J. Flanigan
Telecommunications Industry Association
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 350
Washington, DC 20004

Lawrence E. Sarjeant
Linda L. Kent
Keith Townsend
John W. Hunter
United States Telecom Association
1401 H Street, N.W.. Suite 600
Washington, DC 20005

Robert L. Hoggarth
Donald Vasek
Personal Communications Industry
Association
500 Montgomery Street, Suite 700
Alexandria, VA 22314

Sylvia Lesse John Kuykendall Kraskin, Lesse & Cosson, LLP 2120 L Street, Nw Suite 520

Washington, DC 20037

Barbara Nowlin

\*\*Hand Delivery